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well. (Tr. 9/14/07, p.67, Ls.18-25.) Each unit was rented separately under separate 
rental agreements. (Tr. 9/14/07, p.54, L.5 - p.55, L.22.) 
I On March 3, 2007, Mr. Graf's and Ms. Warrell's infant child passed away and 
I 
emergency services were called. (R., pp.40-44.) Officers subsequently obtained a 
1 search warrant to search the entire residence. (R., pp.40-41.) The Affidavit for Search 
Warrant explained that after Mr. Graf and Ms. Warrell reported that their two month old 
baby appeared deceased, responding officers saw three visible spoons with what 
appeared to be methamphetamine on the bed. (R., pp.43-44.) These spoons ultimately 
tested positive for methamphetamine. (R., pp.43-44.) The affidavit represented that 
officers believed the child's death may have been related to the presence of controlled 
substances. (R., p.44.) Additionally, the affidavit stated that Officer Stiles, the affiant, 
could smell the "odor of growing marijuana in the residence, apparently coming from an 
upstairs bedroom that is locked." (R., p.44.) The affidavit described the home as a 
single family residence and did not mention Mr. Reynolds or the fact the odor was 
coming from the room that belonged to him and not Mr. Graf or Ms. Warrell. (R., pp.43- 
45.) Pursuant to the search warrant officers searched the entire home. (Tr. 9/14/07, 
p.22, L.8 - p.23, L.15.) The search ultimately revealed marijuana plants and 
paraphernalia in Mr. Reynolds' room. (Tr. 9/14/07, p.23, L.19 - p.24, L.7.) 
Mr. Reynolds was charged by Information with manufacturing of a controlled 
substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.20-21.) He subsequently filed 
a Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support Thereof arguing that the evidence 
found in Mr. Reynolds bedroom should be suppressed because the search of his room 
violated his right to be free from unlawful searches. (R., pp.31-45.) The State filed a 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Reynolds' motion to suppress because the 
warrant lacked particularity regarding the search of Mr. Reynolds' apartment? 
over which the Appellate Court exercises free review. Sfafe v. Hawkins, 131 ldaho 396, 
400, 958 P.2d 22, 26 (Ct. App. 1998); Stafe v. Mclnfee, 124 ldaho 803, 804, 864 P.2d 
641,642 (Ct. App. 1993). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Reynolds' Motion To Suppress 
Because The Warrant Lacked Particularitv Renardina The Search Of 
Mr. Reynolds' Bedroom Apartment 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[tlhe right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV; ldaho Const. Art. I, § 17. The "physical entry of the home is fhe 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendmenf is directed ...." State v. 
Johnson, 110 ldaho 516, 523, 716 P.2d 1288, 1295 (1986) (quoting United States v. 
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)) (emphasis original). Both the 
Fourth Amendment and Article 1, section 17 of the ldaho Constitution require that a 
warrant must "'particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or thing to 
be seized."' State v. Teal, 145 ldaho 985, 989, 188 P.3d 927, 931 (2008). Neither 
make a distinction between owned and rented living quarters; therefore, if a tenant has 
not abandoned the premises, the protection of the Fourth Amendment and Art. 1, 5 17 
is not lost. Johnson, 110 ldaho at 523, 716 P.2d at 1295; Abel v. United States, 362 
U.S. 217, 241 (1960). Furthermore, ldaho Code § 19-4403 states "A search warrant 
cannot be issued but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing 
the person, and particularly describing the property and the place to be searched." 
I.C. § 19-4403 (emphasis added.) 
Here, Mr. Reynolds contends that the warrant in this case did not describe the 
place to be searched with particularity because the residence was not a single family 
Id. at 529. In Unifed Sfafes v. Sanfore, 290 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1959) the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that officers did not know and did not have reason to know that 
what appeared as a single family home was actually two separate residences. Sanfore, 
290 F.2d at 67. See also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 83 (1987) (finding it was 
not unconstitutional to search respondents third floor apartment where officers did not 
know the third floor contained two apartments and officers ceased searching once they 
realized two apartments were present and the respondent was not the owner described 
in the warrant); La Fave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE VOI. 2, § 4.5(b) at 530 (noting Unifed 
Sfafes v. Sanfore is the leading case regarding subunits within what appears to be a 
single occupancy structure). The court noted that "[tlhe agents were not warned of a 
possible dual occupancy of the house until after they had shown the copy of the warrant 
to [the resident] and had entered inside. At that moment it was too late for them, 
consistent with the success of their mission, to have retreated and obtained a new 
warrant." Sanfore. 290 F.2d at 67. 
Similarly the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized exceptions to the 
general voiding of a warrant for an undisclosed multiunit structure only if "the defendant 
was in control of the whole premises or they were occupied in common, if the entire 
premises were suspect, or if the multi-unit character of the premises was not known to 
the officers." Unifed Sfafes v. Gilman, 684 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 1982). The court 
noted that the testimony and affidavits of the officers demonstrated that there was not 
misconduct. Id. The officers had conducted surveillance of the premises, the premises 
was a single building, and the officers were not aware that separate living quarters were 
contained in the building or that it housed unrelated persons. Id. Additionally, the 
rarely saw them unless they were in the kitchen making dinner. (Tr. 9/14/07, p.59, 
Ls.20-25.) He also again told Sargeant Birch that the room next to him belonged to 
Justin Higby and that Mr. Higby was at work. (Tr. 9/14/07, p.60, Ls.9-13.) Finally, when 
questioned by Detective Stiles, Mr. Reynolds again informed the officer that "Justin 
rented the room next to mine, he asked me what did I mean. And I said the parents rent 
the basement. The whole basement's theirs. I rent my room. That room's mine. Justin 
rents that room." (Tr. 9/14/07, p.61, L.22 - p.62, L.2.) He also explained that all the 
residents were on different contracts and that they all pay rent at different times. 
(Tr. 9/14/07, p.62, Ls.2-3.) 
Although, Mr. Reynolds did testify that he did not see a distinction between the 
words roommate's and renters and that he may have used the word roommates to 
describe his co-residents instead of renters; Mr. Reynolds explicitly testified that he 
informed the officers about the separate residential agreements and that only he had 
access to his room, none of the other tenants did. (Tr. 9/14/07, p.71, Ls.11-23, p.73, 
Ls.1-18.) Therefore, the officers knew that Mr. Reynolds was the only one with access 
to his room, and that it was unrelated adults living in the residence and sharing only the 
common areas. The officers should have known based on this information that the 
house was a multi-unit or multi-residence building rather than a single family home. 
Furthermore, despite these representations by Mr. Reynolds and Detective 
Stile's awareness that it was unrelated adults living in the home and that Mr. Reynolds 
was the only one with access to his bedroom, no mention of Mr. Reynolds or these 
arrangements was mentioned in the affidavit to get the warrant. The portion of the 
affidavit referring to the suspected marijuana stated only, 
action. Id. "There can be no question that the exception does not swallow the rule- 
exceptions to the warrant requirement for home entries are 'few in number and carefully 
delineated."' Id. (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 446 U.S. 740, 749 (1984)). The State 
bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of "'the existence of such an 
exceptional situation."' Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1978) (quoting Vale v. 
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970). 
Here, when ruling on Mr. Reynolds' motion to suppress, the district court first 
ruled that a warrant was not necessary to search Mr. Reynolds' bedroom because the 
officers could have conducted a warrantless search of his room based on the smell of 
marijuana emanating from it alone. (R., pp.71-72.) This ruling is incorrect because the 
smell of marijuana alone did not create an exigent circumstance, and the search of 
Mr. Reynold's room would have exceeded the scope of the exigency the officer's were 
responding to. 
1. The Smell Of Mariiuana Alone Did Not Create An Exiqent 
Circumstance Justifyinq A Warrantless Search Of Mr. Reynolds' 
Bedroom A~artment 
Although the plain smell of marijuana emanating from somewhere else in the 
building can provide probable cause for a warrant to search that room or unit, the smell 
along does not provide an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless search. 
Sfafe v. Rigoulof, 123 Idaho 267, 846 P.2d 918 (1992) (holding that the smell of 
marijuana coming from the home could be used as probable cause to obtain a warrant 
because the officers were located where they had a legal right to be when they smelled 
the marijuana); Sfafe V. Tiefsort, 145 ldaho 112, 175 P.3d 801 (Ct. App. 2007) ("What is 
lawfully seen in open view may furnish probable cause for a warrant."). Furthermore, 
Here the exigency which allowed the officers to enter the home was the death of 
the infant child in the basement apartment; therefore, officers were limited to responding 
to this exigency. Therefore, the district court's finding that the smell of marijuana itself 
would have justified a warrantless entry into Mr. Reynolds' room was erroneous and if 
this Court finds that the warrant lacked particularity as argued in section l(C) above this 
evidence should be suppressed. 
E. The Evidence Seized As A Resuit Of The Unlawful Search Should Have Been 
Suppressed 
The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of evidence, obtained either directly or 
indirectly from an unlawful search or seizure, against the defendant. Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-485 (1963); State v. Schrecengost, 134 ldaho 547, 
549, 6 P.3d 403, 405 (Ct. App. 2000). However, evidence will not be excluded if the 
causal connection between the police action and the acquisition of the evidence has 
been broken, and therefore, the evidence was not obtained through the exploitation of 
the initial illegality. Schrecengost, 134 ldaho at 549, 6 P.3d at 406. Because the 
evidence obtained against Mr. Reynolds was obtained directly from the unlawful search 
in this case, Mr. Reynolds asserts that all other evidence obtained as a result of the 
illegal search of his room must be suppressed. 
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